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The Conservation  Title (Title XII) of the  1985 Food Security Act
(FSA) is unique  in the history of farm legislation.  Its distinction
arises,  not  because  conservation  goals  have  never been  addressed
by farm legislation (they have  been included  since the original  farm
bills  of the  1930s),  but because  the  1985  FSA makes  conservation
goals consistent  with and, to  some extent,  superior  to commodity
price support and farm income goals.  This reorientation  of legislative
goals has necessitated  new approaches to the implementation of con-
servation  programs  and  gives  new,  often unfamiliar  responsibilities
to the programs' administrators.
Implementation Status of Conservation Provisions
Provisions  of the major new conservation  programs authorized by
the 1985  FSA are summarized  in Table  1. Each of the programs is
presently in a different  stage of implementation.
The Conservation  Reserve Program  (CRP) was initiated early  in
1986 and  has undergone several modifications  over subsequent
years.  The  first sign-up  for the program  was held in March  1986
under  an initial  implementation  scheme  that identified  69 million
highly erodible  acres  eligible  for the  program,  and  under which
rental rate bids from potential participants were successful only if
they were less than  or equal  to an unannounced  maximum accept-
able rental rate. Results  of the first sign-up were disappointing.  Less
than 20 percent of only 4.8 million acres bid was accepted.  In subse-
quent sign-ups,  eligibility  criteria were expanded to include more
acreage  eligible under different  definitions of "highly erodible"  land,
and  maximum acceptable  rental  rates were  preannounced.  A  one-
time bonus payment for  corn  acreage enrolled  in  the CRP  was
offered  in 1987  to  encourage  participation  in the Corn Belt.  By the
end of 1987,  22 million acres had been enrolled. In 1988, USDA made
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115Table 1. Major Conservation Provisions of the 1985 Food Security Act
Conservation Reserve Program
Provides annual rental  payments to land owners/operators  retiring highly erodible and other envi-
ronmentally  critical lands  from crop  production  for  ten years.  Also  provides technical  assistance
and  cost share  payments  up  to 50  percent  of the cost establishing  a  soil conserving  cover  on  the
retired land.  Rental  payments  to any person may  not exceed $50,000  per year. County  enrollment
limited to no more than 25 percent of cropland unless  a special waiver  is given by USDA. Program
initiated  in  1986.
Highly Erodible Land Provisions
*  Sodbuster: requires that farmers who convert highly-erodible  native range or woodland to  crop
production must do  so under an approved  conservation  plan  to maintain soil erosion at or
below the soil loss tolerance  level,  or forfeit eligibility for USDA program benefits.  Program  ini-
tiated in  1986.
*  Conservation  Compliance: requires  that farmers  with  highly-erodible  land  begin to implement
approved conservation  plans on such  lands by 1 January  1990  and complete implementation  by
1995,  or lose eligibility for USDA program benefits.
Swampbuster
*  Requires that farmers  who  convert wetlands  to crop production  lose eligibility  for USDA pro-
gram benefits  unless USDA  determines  that conversion  would  have  only a  minimal  effect on
wetland hydrology and biology.  Program initiated in  1986.
several  additional  changes.  To  encourage  tree  planting  on  CRP
acreage,  erodibility requirements  were relaxed  for enrollees  who
plant trees.  To achieve greater water quality benefits from the CRP,
land to be  used as  filter strip areas between cropland  and bodies  of
surface  water  was made  eligible  for  the program regardless  of the
erodibility  of such  land.  To  balance  regional  distribution  of CRP
land,  maximum  allowable  rental rates were adjusted upward  in low
participation  areas.  These periodic  changes  represent  increasing
flexibility in the program  as it matures towards its 1990  zenith.  Addi-
tional changes  are likely.  Following  the drought  of 1988  and  corre-
sponding  expectations for high commodity prices,  only around 2.5
million  acres were  successfully  bid  into  the  CRP  during its  seventh
sign-up.  With  about 27-28  million acres  now enrolled,  serious  ques-
tions are  arising about  whether  it  is possible  to  meet the  40-45 mil-
lion acre enrollment goal by 1990.
Sodbuster and Swampbuster provisions  were  also  implemented
soon after passage  of the  1985  FSA.  But it is  difficult  to judge  from
these programs'  national performance the extent to which they have
been  enforced  over the last two years.  Since December  1986,  eligi-
bility for  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (USDA)  farm  program
benefits  has  been  forfeited  by  105  farmers  for  converting  highly
erodible  land to  crop  production  without  implementing  a conserva-
tion  plan.  There  are only  five  instances recorded  of farmers  having
had farm program benefits  revoked for converting  wetlands to crop
production.  This  low level of activity belies the serious effort now
being pursued by farm interest groups to liberalize  the  definitions of
swampbusting and sodbusting.
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est impact on the agricultural sector,  is in a much earlier stage of im-
plementation.  While the general nature of compliance  provisions has
been advertised  to farmers  over the last  two years, the rules and
regulations  for its  implementation  were  only  recently  finalized  and
preparatory work  for the program is still underway.  By the summer
of 1988,  USDA had made  determinations  of the  highly  erodible  sta-
tus of close  to  100 million acres  of cropland,  and informed  owners
and operators.  By the end of 1988,  USDA hopes to have completed
65 percent  of the conservation  plans that will need to be in place by
1990 for use as benchmarks  to determine  whether farmers are  in
compliance.  In the meantime,  though,  the rules and  regulations  for
compliance  are somewhat less precise than originally  envisioned  by
some proponents of compliance.  Strict adherence to the  soil loss tol-
erance rate  will not be a criterion for conservation  plan approval.  It
will be left to Soil Conservation Service field offices to judge whether
plans are economically as well as technically feasible alternatives for
meeting compliance.
There are also several  programs or provisions that are authorized
by the  1985  FSA  but have  not at this  point been implemented.  For
example,  the act authorizes  a multi-year setaside  program for which
no implementation strategy has been developed.
Old Lessons  Retaught
As focus begins to shift towards development of a 1990  farm bill,  it
is useful to  review what has been learned  in the course  of imple-
menting the present legislation.  As a first experience  with farm legis-
lation that:  (1)  incorporates goals unassociated with farmers and food
consumers; and (2)  relies on differentiating land by its physical char-
acteristics,  implementation  of the  1985  FSA  conservation  provisions
provides valuable lessons for the success  of future environmental
quality provisions within a farm bill.
Experience  in carrying out the conservation  provisions of the  1985
FSA has mostly reaffirmed  some time-tested policy principles.
Actions Speak Louder than Words
Are  the conservation  provisions  of the  1985 FSA  proving suc-
cessful in achieving the goals envisioned by those who  originally de-
veloped or lobbied for the legislation?  Quite possibly, they are. But if
they are not,  it  is due  to the significant transformation  that takes
place  as  policies  evolve  from legislation  (words)  to  implementation
(action).
The conservation provisions of the  1985 FSA are broad and discre-
tionary.  They legislate goals,  but are not overly specific  with respect
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pends  almost  entirely  upon  the  implementation  process  (Dicks  and
Grano).
Given  only  broad  guidance  and  a great  deal of discretionary
power,  it is up to USDA as the implementing institution to determine
who  may  participate  in  each  program,  what  incentives  will  be
offered  for participation,  and how participants  will be selected.  The
specific  tools applied  to define  these parameters  and the strategy
employed  to use those tools  are what determines the manner and
extent to which broadly legislated goals are actually achieved.
There  is certainly wisdom in this approach.  It places control  of the
programs in the hands of those  who possess the  best data and tech-
nical knowledge  of program  parameters.  It also  assures that flexibil-
ity can be built into the programs  to adapt to changing  social or eco-
nomic  conditions.
But the discretionary approach  is also uncertain.  It can mean that
the actions  resulting from implementation  do not coincide  with some
observers'  interpretation  of the  legislation.  For example,  the charge
is currently  being  leveled  that USDA has  "taken the  teeth out of
Conservation  Compliance"  by leaving  determinations  of compliance
up to the judgment  of local  officials  under  vaguely  specified  guide-
lines.  We  have  yet to witness whether  the guidelines  for Conserva-
tion Compliance  will result in major improvements  in the consistency
between  conservation  and commodity  programs,  but  it is clear  that
the eventual result  will have much more to do with the program's
implementation  than its legislation.
You  Can't Please Everyone
Another notable characteristic  of the  1985 FSA conservation provi-
sions, particularly the CRP,  is the multiple-objective  nature of the
legislation.  The CRP alone  is to  meet five sets of objectives  (soil ero-
sion  reduction,  commodity  supply  control,  farm  income  mainte-
nance, improved  wildlife habitat and improved  water quality),  ac-
cording to the legislation.  Only limited guidance was given regarding
the  weights that legislators placed on the various objectives.  Thus,  it
was largely  up to the implementors to  decide on the objectives'
prioritization.
While it is entirely possible to manage a single policy instrument in
a manner that maximizes  net social welfare,  when  a program has
multiple goals,  no single  goal  is likely  to be maximized  without trad-
ing off performance  in achieving another  goal or goals. For example,
let's look  at the CRP  in  light of the  conflicts  and complementarities
between its erosion reduction and surplus commodity  supply control
objectives.  To a certain extent,  these two objectives  are complemen-
tary.  When acreage  is enrolled  in the  CRP,  surplus crop  production
will decline  by  a percentage  of the acreage  retirement  effect.  How-
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productivity of land,  one cannot target the most highly erodible  land
for CRP enrollment  without giving up some  supply control.  Similar-
ly,  using the  CRP to maximize supply  control would require  signifi-
cant forfeiture of the program's potential to reduce soil erosion.
The implementors  of programs with nonprioritized  multiple objec-
tives must  either:  (1) independently  designate  the primary objective
and target  the  program  to  maximize  that one  goal  while  relegating
others  to "second  best"  criteria;  or  (2)  muddle through  by  meeting
all objectives  to some extent while maximizing  none.  In either case,
some interest  groups concerned  with maximum achievement  of par-
ticular goals will be unsatisfied.
No  Free Lunch
One of the original selling points for the conservation provisions
was that they would  pay for themselves.  The CRP,  in particular,
was estimated to be achievable  at no net cost to the  federal budget.
The theory,  quite reasonable  at the time it was offered,  was that di-
rect budget savings  (in the form of deficiency payments  foregone by
giving up a portion of commodity program base acreage  when en-
rolling in the  CRP)  and indirect cost savings  (through commodity
price enhancement brought about by mass acreage retirement via
CRP)  would more  than offset the cost of rental and  cost share pay-
ments to CRP participants.  In addition,  Sodbuster and Swamp-
buster would reduce the amount of program slippage  otherwise real-
ized  by  bringing  new  land  into  production,  and  Conservation
Compliance  would extend  the benefits of acreage  reduction beyond
the program payment period.
During  the first two years  of CRP  implementation,  it did,  indeed,
look as if the program was proceeding at no  net cost.  Rental pay-
ments were relatively low for acreage initially enrolled and, because
commodity  prices were  low, the value  of deficiency  payments  fore-
gone was  high. The latter was,  for awhile,  offsetting the former.
It is now becoming increasingly  apparent  that the  CRP cannot be
fully  enrolled  at a  cost below the  Commodity  Credit Corporation
(CCC) payments it precludes.  The first parcels of land enrolled in the
CRP were  likely those with the  lowest reservation  price  demanded
by their owners or operators.  The average CRP rental rate has since
been creeping upward,  reflecting the simple  fact that in order to ob-
tain larger quantities  of a good, the average price must rise.  If we
also consider that the land enrolled initially may have lower produc-
tivity than the remaining eligible acreage,  attempting to enroll not
just more but also better quality  land implies  even steeper rental
rate increases will be necessary.
Furthermore, the rate of return  to land in production has risen as
commodity  prices  have increased;  gradually  at first,  and  then more
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tations shift towards increasing future  commodity prices, the CRP
will  seem,  even at  modestly  increased  rental  rates,  an  unattractive
alternative.  Program administrators have  acknowledged that "while
there  is  a lot  of eligible  land potentially  available  for CRP,  the
amount  of eligible  land  where  CRP offers  rates  of return of 10  per-
cent or more is much smaller,"  and "to attract more eligible acres
into CRP  . . , additional  incentives would be needed"  (Hertz,  p.
16).  In short,  rental  payments  must  exceed CCC  cost savings  or the
CRP will fall short of its 40- to 45-million-acre  goal.
It is not as if the  cost of the  CRP has no outstanding  benefits asso-
ciated with  it.  In fact,  the program has had an unprecedented  effect
in reducing total soil erosion and the offsite damages  associated  with
erosion.  It is likely that the offsite,  social benefits of the CRP out-
weigh  the program's  cost.  But those new benefits  did not come free
of charge.
Don't Put All Your Eggs  in One  Basket
One  of the more  novel features  of the  1985  FSA conservation
provisions-their  consistency  with commodity  programs-may prove
also to be their downfall.  The Sodbuster,  Swampbuster  provision
and  Conservation  Compliance  were not just made consistent  with
other farm  programs,  they were inextricably linked with them by
virtue of the fact that the enormity  of the penalty for noncompliance
is a function of the attractiveness  of the other programs'  benefits.
This relationship  works fine when there  are conditions  of surplus
and low  commodity  prices,  such as  there were  when the  legislation
was formulated. But now,  with depleted  stocks,  rising commodity
prices,  and excellent  prospects  for high,  near-term,  market-
determined farm  income,  the  tight linkage  between  programs looks
much less desirable.
As  commodity program payment levels decline,  both for legislated
and unpredicted  reasons, the penalty  for noncompliance  with the
Sodbuster,  Swampbuster  provision and Conservation  Compliance
also diminishes.  By tying these programs'  incentives to the existence
of other  farm programs,  we  have made  their success  in conserving
soil resources a direct function of unrelated  programs' benefits.
Of course,  even  without  the  direct linkage  between  programs,
land  owners'  and operators'  personal  tradeoffs  between  cultivation
and conservation  decisions are  strongly  influenced  by  prevailing
market  conditions.  A range  of factors  beyond legislators'  and imple-
mentors' control,  such as drought, interest rates, exchange  rates and
foreign  demand for agricultural  goods,  can have a  greater effect  on
the success  of the conservation  provisions  than any program-related
variable.
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The success  of the new conservation  approaches  described by the
1985  FSA has  relied,  as  well,  on timely and  reliable  information
transfer.
Low rates of initial bidding for entry to the CRP and unrealistic
bidding during  the  first CRP  sign-up have been attributed  to  a lack
of adequate  information  by farmers about the program's implemen-
tation (Hertz; Ervin).  Surveys conducted within the first year of CRP
implementation found that many landowners  either did not know
whether  their land was  eligible  for the  program,  or  had  incorrectly
assessed  their  land's  eligibility  (American  Farmland  Trust;  Esseks
and Kraft).  As recently  as April  1988,  more than  13  percent of 1,261
surveyed  field representatives  of the Soil Conservation  Service,  Ag-
ricultural  Stabilization  and  Conservation  Service,  and  Cooperative
Extension  Service felt that farmers in their counties inaccurately rec-
ognized the existence of "highly  erodible land"  on their cropland
(Soil  and  Water  Conservation  Society).  About  one-fourth  of that
same group surveyed felt they needed  more factual  information  and
educational materials  in order to implement  the conservation  provi-
sions in their counties  (Soil and Water Conservation Society).
The more  flexibility that is built into a program, the more  likely it
is that its rules and regulations will be periodically  modified to adapt
to new conditions  or refine program performance.  While  such flexi-
bility  is  a desirable  trait,  it can also lead  to problems in information
transfer.  The  need to frequently  communicate  changes in  CRP and
Conservation  Compliance  program  direction  is  a  source  of frustra-
tion to some local program administrators,  and the receipt of con-
flicting information  has been identified  as one,  albeit minor,  reason
that farmers  are not participating  in the CRP  (Soil and  Water Con-
servation Society).
On the other hand,  it has been aptly  pointed out that "farmers  are
astute and quickly  learn the government strategy"  for implementing
flexible  programs (Dicks and Grano).  Once  the game  plan is figured
out, farmers' own adaptive strategies can lead to paradoxical pro-
gram  results.  For  example,  farmers  participating  in the  CRP  or
those  in compliance  with highly erodible  land provisions  can still
cultivate  new  or existing  nonerodible  lands  in  areas  or  in  manners
that create worse  water  quality or wildlife habitat problems than
cultivating  highly erodible lands.  It is possible that commodity price
increases  attributable  to the  conservation  provisions  could encour-
age such behavior.  And, certainly,  the programs provide  no disin-
centive  for expansion  of cultivation  on fragile lands by those who do
not typically participate  in farm programs.  Thus,  information that
feeds  back the aggregate,  net effects  of the conservation  provisions
also  is needed by program implementors.  Unfortunately,  the lags  in
provision of aggregate data are often too great to be useful in design-
ing remedial  action by program administrators.
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While  there  is no doubt that the  CRP and highly erodible  land
provisions  are  proving  successful  in  substantially  reducing  soil ero-
sion,  many  have questioned  the cost  effectiveness  of the  programs.
Taff  and Runge  suggest  that the  CRP  "is  so encumbered  with sec-
ondary objectives  that it costs more  and  accomplishes less than it
should"  (Taff and Runge,  p.  16).  One analysis  of CRP  first-year per-
formance  finds that "net  government  cost  could  have been reduced
while  simultaneously  increasing  the  extent  to which  erosion and
supply control  objectives were  met" (Reichelderfer  and Boggess,  p.
1).  Ervin  explains the problem  as  "a  lack of precision  in  identifying
CRP  benefits  with  enrollment  criteria"  (Ervin,  p.  185).  Since there
are no criteria  that identify the degree of off-site and on-site  dam-
ages associated with parcels of land eligible for CRP or subject to the
highly erodible  land provisions,  there  is  no  mechanism  for assuring
that net social benefits are optimized and no guarantee that the ben-
efits even exceed the programs' unit transaction  costs.
A proposed  solution to this problem,  caused by an inherent lack of
benefit-cost  balancing  instruments,  is  to  implement  enrollment  and
compliance procedures  that incorporate variation in the character
and  value  of program  benefits  across units  of land  (Phipps).  Others
propose  a  differentiation  of conservation  and  supply  control  objec-
tives  into separate  programs,  each targeting  land  with  charac-
teristics  that make  it most appropriate  for  accomplishment  of inde-
pendent  objectives (Taff and Runge).
Such suggestions  for improved  efficiency  of program  performance
are laudable and have great merit in theory,  but they quickly break
down in practice.  They presume  both  that:  (1)  there is a practical
mechanism  for characterizing  each unit of land's erosion potential
and productivity  on continuous scales;  and (2)  associated market and
nonmarket benefits of the lands'  retirement  can easily  be measured.
Unfortunately,  the data required  to  do this  are not available.  Their
collection,  while  adding  precision  to targeting  of  program  benefits,
would  also  add  considerably  to  program  costs.  As  one  program  ad-
ministrator  puts  it:  "Even  in  their  current  simplified  forms,  (these)
programs  are  huge  vastly  complicated  undertakings  that require
multiple  volumes of written procedures,  months of software develop-
ment  and  months  of  training and  implementation  for  roughly  3,000
county  and  state  offices"  (Harte,  pp.  41-42).  Even  modest  changes
can  add to  the burden of understaffed  local offices.  Significant
change  would likely require new  long-term  and costly  commitments
to undertake detailed data collection efforts.
The limitations that data availability  places  on the  precision of the
farm program benefit-cost balancing act may be even more apparent
as farm legislation continues  to directly address conservation and en-
vironmental issues.
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With the passage  of the  1985  FSA, farm legislation began  what  is
likely to be a swift  evolution  away from  strict focus  on farm income
and food and fiber costs towards increasing  incorporation  of envi-
ronmental quality  objectives.  The  1985  FSA conservation  provisions
are a modest forebearer of an inevitable  trend fueled by fading farm
fundamentalism  and increasing  concern for water  quality  and other
environmental  problems related to agricultural production.
Due to the relative  success  of the conservation  provisions in meet-
ing social goals unrelated to agriculture  sector performance,  they
have formed  models for consideration of 1990  farm bill initiatives.
Ideas have  already informally  surfaced from private interest groups
and Congressional staffs for  inclusion in the 1990 farm  bill of such
things as:  (1) a "chemical  compliance"  provision modeled  after Con-
servation  Compliance  but aimed  at requiring farm program partici-
pants to use specified  fertilization  and pesticide  use practices;  (2)
conservation  easements  for the  preservation  of wetlands;  (3)  water
quality  "compliance"  with respect to management  practices on land
near  well heads;  and (4)  expansion of the CRP  to include  more
acreage  targeted  towards nonerodible  but environmentally  sensitive
areas.
Experience  gained  in implementing  the 1985  FSA conservation
provisions offers  some constructive  guidance  to development of a
1990  farm bill.  From the preceding review  of some  lessons  in  prog-
ress, one might draw the following suggestions for current legislators
and future implementors.
1.  Policy  formulators  and legislators  need to strike a delicate  bal-
ance  between  specification  of intent  and discretion  granted the  pol-
icies' implementors;  one that provides flexibility in program develop-
ment but assures the policies'  goals will be met.
2.  Policy formulators and legislators need to consider either: (a)
designating  separate  programs for independent  policy objectives;  or
(b) assigning  clear priorities  to  multiple-objective  programs,  if they
are dissatisfied with the degree to which environmental  quality goals
are being met in current farm legislation.
3.  It would be wise for all participants in the upcoming farm policy
dialogue  to recognize  that if farm legislation  is to address  a new  set
of policy  objectives,  along with its standard protection of farm in-
come and food prices, it is not likely to come without additional  cost.
No matter how complementary  the set of policies legislated,  if imple-
menting agencies  are to shift the area of programs'  concerns,  it will
likely require new resources and administrative expense.
4.  New  policies and programs need to be designed in anticipation
of shifting  social  and economic conditions;  not tied to the  short-term
conditions  existing at the time of policy formulation.
1235.  Local  knowledge  and information  transfer will be  especially
critical  to  the  successful  incorporation  of additional  environmental
quality goals into farm legislation,  since site-specificity  is likely  to be
an important factor in program implementation.
6.  Assuring that  new programs  with environmental  quality  objec-
tives are  cost effective  will require a great deal more data and infor-
mation than is currently  available to relate agricultural production  to
environmental  quality  and  to  place  values  on  agricultural  exter-
nalities.
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